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THE DEATH OF E PLURIBUS UNUM
ROBERT EMMETT BURNS*
All trust in Constitutions is grounded on the assurance they
may afford, not that the depositories of power will not, but
that they cannot misemploy it.
-John Stuart Mill
EVEN YEARS after the passage of the fourteenth amendment, a
black citizen brought a civil rights action against the owner of
a coffee house for refusing him refreshment, "on grounds he
was a man of color."' The owner of the coffee house sought a
jury trial. It was 1875. The plaintiff was black. A jury would
be white. Defendant's demand was denied. He was not entitled
to a jury trial under applicable state law. Judgment for plaintiff
was entered for $1,000 against cafe owner who appealed, insisting
that a new due process clause of the new fourteenth amendment gave
him a constitutional right to a trial by jury. Chief Justice White,
whose opinion was well within the main stream of contemporary con-
stitutional philosophy, wrote: "The states, so far as this amendment
is concerned, are left to regulate trials in their own court in their
own way."2
Ninety years later, on May 20, 1968, a 7-2 majority of the Su-
preme Court, in review under the same due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, this time declared that Louisiana and every
* MR. BURNS received his B.S. from the College of the Holy Cross, his LL.B.
from the Yale University School of Law, and his LL.M. from the New York Uni-
versity Law School where he was Marshall Fellow in civil liberties. He is Professor
of Law at DePaul University College of Law, and author of a forthcoming book en-
titled THE HONORABLE LIE.
1. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
2. Id. at 92. In Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879), the Supreme Court
seemed even more emphatic: "We might go still further, and say, with undoubted
truth, that there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State from adopting
any system of laws or judicature it sees fit for all or any part of its territory. If
the State of New York, for example, should see fit to adopt the civil law and its
method of procedure for New York City and the surrounding counties, and the
common law and its method of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing
in the Constitution of the United States to prevent its doing so."
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other state in the Union, in all criminal cases in which federal courts
would award jury trial, must award jury trials.8 One hundred eighty-
eight years of separate jury trial procedures among the states became
unconstitutional in appeal from the same state in construction of
the same clause of the same Constitution by dint of review right suc-
cinctly stated in the first Louisiana jury case: "Our power over that
law is only to determine whether it is in conflict with the supreme
law of the land."4  By what power may the Supreme Court decree
uniform trial procedures for every state court in the nation? Why
is it that the strictures of a written constitution are subject to such
broad interpretation? The answer lies in the phrase "due process
of law."5
3. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
4. Supra note 1, at 93. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 at 77 (1970),
Chief Justice Burger, apparently still unattuned to one-nation due process, writes
in dissent: "I find it somewhat disconcerting that with the constant urging to
adjust ourselves to being a 'pluralistic society'-and I accept this in its broad
sense-we find constant pressure to conform to some uniform pattern on the
theory that the Constitution commands it." (Jury required when confinement of 6
months to 1 year possible).
5. The phrase "due process of law" comes from 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354), ".
no man of what Estate or Condition he be, shall be put out of Lands or Tenements,
nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being brought
in Answer by due Process of the Law."
This statute in turn is based on famous Chapter 39 of Magna Carta, which the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 paraphrases thus: "No subject shall be arrested,
imprisoned, despoiled or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out
of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty or estate, but by the
judgment of his peers or the law of the land." (per legem terram)
An English Jurist, Sir Edward Coke, in the 17th Century had found a very con-
venient need and use for this phrase to give substance for resolving a problem in his
own days: Was the King a divine right law unto himself or under the law? In
one of the struggles for supremacy between King and Parliament (1612), the ques-
tion arose in Bonham's case whether the King could order the arrest of a free man
without assigning a reason for it. It was Coke's contention that law should not be
governed by the arbitrary will of the King, but by unwritten precedent and traditions
like Magna Carta. Magna Carta required the King to conform according to the
law of the land (per legem terrain) which, by custom, required notice, a hearing,
reasons, or-in short--due process of law. See LYON & BLOCK, EDWARD COKE,
ORACLE OF THE LAW (1929).
Coke held that no man is above the law; the law is reason. Reason is precedent.
Precedent is Magna Carta and Magna Carta says NO man could be deprived of
liberty except per legem et terrain (according to the law of the land), or due process of
law. Coke equated the phrase due process of law, which meant fair procedures, to
the Magna Carta phrase per legem terrain, or law of the land. At the time of
Coke's decision, it was not clear whether the King or Parliament (of which the
judiciary was to become part) was to be supreme sovereign law-giver. For a last
comprehensive post-Civil War review of Lord Coke's phrases and usages before the
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The transformation of the due process clause from a recognition
of state power over its own procedure, to a grant of legislative
power to the supreme judiciary, is the most significant development,
for good or ill, in American Constitutional Government. The revo-
lution took ten years.
In their beginnings, anyway, the post-Civil War amendments were
enacted to preserve something. The Constitution of 1787 had
sought through the Union to avoid two scourges of government
by the people: the tyranny probable from one government, the
anarchy likely from many.6
The great writing had defined not one, but two governments. In-
deed, without free states, the Constitution envisioned, this country
would have been just another government having three branches and
thirteen provinces or departments. Central governments are easy
to form. Apportioned sovereignty is more difficult. Though deli-
cate balance was required if dualism was to work at all, 7 powers
(stated and reserved), their separation (the real separation was not
between Congress, Court and President), twin citizenship, separate
courts, dual sovereignty and federalism describe what was, with its
additional amendments and guarantees of 1791 (The Bill of Rights),
the Constitution, E Pluribus Unum.
revolution of 1890, see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1883).
In England, Parliament is both law-maker (legislator) and enforcer (judge).
The law Parliament enacts as legislator is the law the judges of Parliament interpret
and enforce as adjudicators. Coke's equation of due process with law of the land
prevented the King himself from determining what due process was, but allowed
Parliament to determine it. The will of the King succumbed to the more repre-
sentative will of Parliament. In our country, the United States Constitution was the
law of the land. (Article VI)
6. The fears of one central government among the Colonies seem difficult to
exaggerate: The first ten years' treaty arrangement under the Articles of Confedera-
tion provided central government with no executive or judicial branches. Once
"more perfect union" was complete in 1787, amendments "to prevent misconstruc-
tion or abuse of its powers" (Prologue to Bill of Rights, Line 3) was insisted on by
the states in order to limit Federal power and enhance state prerogatives.
7. Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
429 (1819), saw the principal problem as one of clashing sovereignty or a need to
avoid by constitutional construction the tendency of one government to pull down
what the other built up, that is, the "incompatibility of rights to destroy where there
is a right in another to preserve." Perhaps this accounts for his modest powers
approach which today's Supreme Court follows in review of the exercise of con-
gressional power over interstate commerce, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964), upholding the Public Accommodations Sections of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act over the claim that commerce was but the ostensible purpose to the exercise of
the power.
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The essence of the Union lie in its perhaps preposterous quest for
the squared circle. Government was thought effective because sepa-
rate: Union would accommodate both nation and state, tribe and
country, many and one. The first treaty government under articles of
"Confederation" (1781-87) was a failure. The "more perfect" Union,
a second time, would be Federalism: a dream, the fulfillment or
nightmare" of block, alliance, continent and maybe some day, a world
community.
There were many problems to the pre-Civil War Union. First
among them was the race question. As late as the time of passage
into dreadful revolution, men of color were excluded from citizenship
in Southern, border, and Confederate states and held not entitled to
be federal people by an 1856 decision of the Supreme Court9 de-
claring void an Act of Congress, in conflict (it was said) with a
curious contradictory' ° little British phrase in the fifth amendment,
then binding only Congress and its Federal Courts.
Shortly after the Dred Scott Decision," or the first time the ju-
dicial branch of government declared an act of Congress not to be
8. E.g., pre-W.W.II Balkan Europe; Nigeria; the Middle East; Korea; Ireland;
Vietnam; etc.
9. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
10. The ambiguity of inference to the term due process arises from its origins in
a country which had no constitution.
The United States Constitution had provided in its fifth amendment that NO man
was to be deprived of liberty or property except after "due process of law." The
issue was, however, what agency or government was to legislate meaning or sub-
stance to due process. What is due process is a function of will or law-making.
Whether what was done was done according to due process is in case and contro-
versy to the point a judicial question of judge, intention, reason, and dispute resolu-
tion. Due process meant that notice, fair procedures or hearings should be provided
before taking an individual's life, liberty, or property. The ambiguity to who is it
is greater than what is it. In England at the time of Magna Carta, John was
probably law-maker, only much later was it Parliament. In our country Congress
and the states were to be law-makers. We, however, borrowed a phrase from a
non-constitution country that for five hundred years had convulsed with uncertainty
whether mad kings, parliaments, dictators or judges were law-givers.
If due process meant law of the land, and law of the land was associated with
precedent, which was administered by judges, there is visible logic to the conclusion,
therefore, that law of the land is due process and due process is whatever a judge
holds it to be. The key to the mystery is the phrase according to the law of the
land (per legem terram), which refers not to law-making or substance, but to en-
forcement or procedures of law. The ambiguity remains, however, as to who is to
legislate what that law of the land is. In the Constitution, Article I provided
Congress with legislative power. In England, Parliament is law-maker.
11. In the infamous 1856 Dred Scott case, supra note 9, Scott, a Missouri slave,
1970] DEATH OF E PLURIBUS UNUM 655
due process, 2 there occurred secession from the Union. As Toomes
of Georgia put it in his 18 61 farewell speech to his Senate colleagues: 13
"The Supreme Court has decided that, by the Constitution, we have
was taken into free territory where an act of Congress (the Missouri Compromise)
had prohibited slavery. Several years after his return to Missouri, Scott sued for
freedom which he claimed through his residence in free territory. The Supreme
Court ruled against Scott. The Court held slaves were not citizens, for Federal
purposes, but "property," and under the fifth amendment, Congress could pass
no law depriving citizens of property without due process of law. The Missouri
Compromise was not due process of law.
"Rights of Property," Chief Justice Taney wrote, are "united with the rights of
persons and placed on the same ground by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,
which provides that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property,
without due process of law.'" Taney held as "history," that Scott was for federal
purposes constitutional "property." An act of Congress legislating to the contrary
deprived Scott's owner of property without "due process of law" which, in Taney's
opinion, an act of Congress pursuant to power under Article III, § 4 (giving Con-
gress power to dispose of new territory) was so obviously not.
Dissenting Judge Curtis, citing Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Patrick Henry,
and the Quakers, wrote differently. Only the Dred Scott decision gave the phrase
due process of law any other meaning save an enforcement one.
Taney's view of the phrase "due process of law," personal and subjective (five to
three), would first find judicial vindication some fifty years later when the phrase
"due process" would become, by fiat, "substantive," meaningfully "liberating" the
essence of "liberty" or, in short, almost anything in perpetuity that a majority of five
Justices thought it should be.
12. There seems no special reason why both couldn't be due process. Many
state constitutions borrowed the phrase "due process" in their documents. In
Massachusetts, the phrase used was "according to the law of the land." In those
states, judges could set out common judge-made rules of due process in criminal and
civil matters, but legislation overriding the judges was also due process and entitled
to overriding supremacy. See Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before
the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911). "Indeed the great office of statutes is
to remedy defects in the Common Law as they are developed, and to adapt it to
the changes of time and circumstances." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1871).
An unambiguous hypothetical dialogue might read something like this:
Law-Maker: Where is your power?
Judge: I have Judicial power; I can require you to act according to the
supreme law of the land which is your law and our law.
Law-Maker: But you cannot decide what is the law of the land.
Judge: No, I have the power to require you to conform to the law of the
land. My opinion of what should be is not the law of the land. I
am a judge. I have no power to decide what is the law of the land.
The written Constitution has decided for all of us what is the law
of the land.
Law-Maker: Why was I so confused? I thought you could veto everything of
mine you didn't like and require things you preferred under the
phrase due process, or according to the law of the land.
Judge: Poor boy: A judge can require law-makers to conform to their
established procedures. The fourteenth amendment gave me power
in case and controversy to compel you to accord to black citizens
due process of your (state) law.
13. 3 THE WORLD'S ORATORs 217 (Senators' Edition).
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a right to go to the territories and be protected there with our prop-
erty." The war was about that "property"-one-eighth, in 1861, of
the entire population. Lincoln, at his second inaugural address, amid
the battles, recalled that some of those who attended his first one in
1860 had sought then without a war to "decide effects by negotia-
tions."' 14  He continued:
These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest: All know that this in-
terest was somehow the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate and extend
this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union while the
Government claimed no right to do more than restrict the territorial enlargement
of it.'
The amendments following the battles to rend or save the Union
made very definite changes in the 1787, amendable though perpetual,
power structures: Every one of them in color.
The thirteenth amendment abolished that kind of slavery."6 The
first clause of the fourteenth amendment conferred on blacks federal
citizenship (overruling the Dred Scott Decision); the second, state
citizenship (overruling the Old South); and the remaining portion of
the amendment promised blacks equality in state procedures' 7 (due
process) and state law (equal protection).'"
Drafters' intent to the fourteenth amendment is better summarized
14. 7 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1902, 276-77
(1907).
15. Id. at 276. "... [B]oth parties deprecated war, but one would make war
rather than let the Nation survive and the other would accept war rather than let it
perish, and the war came." Before secession Congress claimed power to restrict
importation of slavery in new territories not yet states (Article III); Congress had no
power to free slaves from state disabilities before the Civil War, for state citizenship
was constitutionally an exclusive state concern. The two-hundred and thirty page
Dred Scott apologia is misleading. Many Americans seem unaware that blacks were
state citizens in most Northern states prior to the Civil War.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. For a "mod" student law review's "new"
thirteenth amendment of "Being Free: Relics, Privacy Rights and Badges," see The
New Thirteenth Amendment-A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294
(1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17. In 1887 Justice Miller, in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105, wrote
in construction of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment: "[I]t is
not possible to hold that a party . . . when, as regards the issues affecting it, he has,
by the laws of the State, a fair trial in a court of justice, according to the modes of
proceeding applicable to such a case."
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a view of the "new" equal protection
in such diverse non-racial matters as poverty, law enforcement, illegitimacy, poll
taxes and reapportionment, see Development in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
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elsewhere.'" Suffice it to suggest for now there was very good reason
why certain judges would, one-hundred seventy years later, gather
a few pebbles of suppositious history from mountains of contrary
evidence audaciously to suggest that the post-war amendments in-
tended anything more than guarantees to black Americans, period,
with no "ifs," "buts" or "ands" to anyone else.2"
Before the Civil War, states could, with impunity, deny to blacks
equality in rights and procedures. Without a fourteenth amendment
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court had the constitutional power
to force any states to provide their black residents with the same
white state law (equal protection) or procedures (due process).
The amendments promised blacks what whites had always had.
After the war, Congress obtained power to enforce the amend-
ments by Express Empowering Clauses. The Court obtained re-
19. See Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds o1 the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 479; S. Boudin, Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth
Amendment, 16 N.Y.U. L. REV. 19 (1938); KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION (1914).
20. Some mountains and pebbles are set out in Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, at 68-132 (1949),
an extraordinary issue (the result of letters, books, documents, and micro study) in
response to Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947),
espousing incorporation. Justice Black was appointed in 1937 and has faithfully since
attacked with vigor the subjective, personal, arbitrary due process of law of "whatever
a majority of the Supreme Court said it was." For his latest thoughts on that sub-
ject, see Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). He
was appointed to rectify the disgraceful property due process era (1897-1937). Why
he should renovate the fourteenth amendment due process with a Federal Bill of
Rights is very understandable. The handful of justices who felt the fourteenth
amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights were identified approvingly by Justice
Douglas, concurring in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). (Unfortunately
it has never commanded a court; yet happily all constitutional questions are always
open.)
Even federalets found refuge from the chills of subjective due process in
a two-dimension or one-level state bill of rights. In 1943 Mr. Justice Jackson wrote,
in Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639, "The test of legislation which collides
with the principles of the First is much more definite than the test when only the
Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disap-
pears when the specific prohibitions of the first amendment become its standard." Id.
at 639. A little later, in 1950, he had changed his mind: "The history of criminal
libel in America convinces me that the 14th Amendment did not incorporate the
1st, that the powers of Congress and of the states over this subject are not of the
same dimensions and that because Congress probably could not enact this law, it
does not follow that the states may not." Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288
(1950). See Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," 78 HARV. L. REV. 746
(1965).
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view jurisdiction because there was a Constitution.2 1
Before the war, the big person-to-person civil rights were the sup-
posed concern of the states. Perhaps the war amendments should
have realigned the old federal balance between states and central
government.
It would have been quite possible for the Federal Government to
impose a single will upon the various states, destroying them as sepa-
rate entities and guaranteeing racial equality by this route. The
thirteenth, fourteenth or fifteenth amendments could have provided
in terms a Constitutional Bill of Rights (under Supreme Court steward-
ship) as everyone's new privilege and immunity. But this would
have mocked the theories of dual citizenship, two constitutions,2 2
federal-state power apportionment, reserved rights, stated powers or,
in short, would have altered in material, non-racial ways the Union,
which the war was fought to preserve.
Instead, the victorious states were left to their way under their union.
The South remained policed with federal occupation troops until "re-
constructed" (1865-1877) into republican "forms" of government
required by Article IV, for admission, or, in their case, "re-entry" to
the E Pluribus Unum 23 of 1787.
21. It is not nowadays, in Bill of Rights areas anyway, necessary to separate the
function of the Supreme Court sitting qua federal judge (supervisor of federal courts)
from our constitutional judge sitting as interpreter of the Constitution.
It is interesting to contrast, however, the constitutional common law of due
process with the pre-Erie v. Tompkins federal brooding common law deveolped by
federal judges sitting with diversity jurisdiction by authority of the Judiciary Act of
1789. Mr. Justice Holmes referred to that process as ".'an unconstitutional assumption
of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array
of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.'" Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79
(1938). Perhaps there will be more to "qua" in review of the Crime Control Act of
1968 overruling in federal courts the deliberately decided, constitutional Miranda
decision.
22. "The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of
much difficulty. The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of
the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the govern-
ment of the individual states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and in
that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its
particular government, as its judgment dictated." Marshall, J., in Barron v. Balti-
more, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 246-47 (1833).
It is interesting to note that the Barron decision, the first post-Civil War incorpora-
tion decision, Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), and the
incorporating process rationale (Davidson v. New Orleans, supra note 17) all were
review cases involving that particular clause requiring just compensation for the
public taking of private property. (U.S. CONsT. amends. V & XIV).
23. The guarantee to every state of a republican form of government has always
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The leading post-war case construing meaning to the war amend-
ments, and the first attempt to argue that they meant more than
black is white occurred in the Slaughter House cases of 1873.24 It
was there urged that the words "privileges" and "immunities" in the
fourteenth amendment provided something for everyone, consisting,
in the main, of new federal privileges and immunities from state law
and government. The eminently citable Justice Miller25 wrote the ma-
jority decision. His opinion (love it, leave it, but read it) saw just
what else in addition to petitioners' supposed federal privilege to
continue his slaughter house business would occur to the supreme
judiciary if the new state amendments were construed to permit either
law maker, Congress or the Court "to incorporate things" into them
for all of us (so to speak) for that
• . .would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the states,
on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not
approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption
of this amendment. 26
And
it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal
governments to each other and of both these governments to the people .... 27
been considered a "political question" resting with Congress to decide which state
governments are established as republican. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1 (1849); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
24. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1872).
25. Justice Miller wrote the Davidson v. New Orleans, supra note 17 opinion
where "inclusion and exclusion" language is standard form, boiler plate due process
"authority." Davidson v. New Orleans, supra note 17, at 101 was his inclusion
reference to a limited set of procedures which only the Supreme Court could define
or to all of the many variations states could contrive. Safe experiment was fed-
eralism.
26. Supra note 24, at 78.
27. Supra note 24, at 78. It is the popular thing to denounce the Supreme
Courts of 1875 and 1883 which declared unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment Section 5 of the Civil Rights Act of Congress which was not sought to be
upheld by reference to interstate commerce power but instead though applicable to
individual discrimination and conspiracies (the Civil Rights cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883))
by resort to implementing power pursuant to an amendment applicable only to
states or state action.
Today's Court familiars seem unable to come to terms with basics. In United
States v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), petitioners, of color, failed in their
charge of a conspiracy to deny first amendment rights to allege anything done
by State Government. The Supreme Court saw the problem in dimension of the
Union which survived the Civil War: "The equality of the rights of citizens is a
principle of republicanism. Every republican government is in duty bound to protect
all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its power. That duty was
originally assumed by the States; and it still remains there." Id. at 555. It could
have been different, but: "Why may not Congress with equal show of authority enact
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The Slaughter House decision left the privileges and immunities
clause with a settled intent and purpose. The amendment clause
forbidding states from depriving any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law, was, at first, ignored as providing
restraining rights over state government, for all it was thought to do
was provide that blacks receive equal notice, hearing, and state pro-
cedures.2
Not every interest was satisfied with mere race amendments. An
age of combine, trust, merger and moguls needed, it was felt, ju-
dicial protection from the many options for creative police power
regulation undoubtedly left states by the Union of 1787.29 Interstate
incorporators were determined to use the amendments for their own
purposes. Apropos of the times from Hayes (1877-1881) to Cleve-
land (1885-1889) was the famous quip, "What's the Constitution
among friends."30  Though it was established that judicial review of
state legislation was limited to express provisions of the Constitution"
a code of laws for the enforcement and vindication of all rights of life, liberty and
property," (The Civil Rights cases, supra at 14.) which would, in principled terms:
"... establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights between man
and man in society. It would be to make Congress take the place of the states'
legislatures and to supersede them." Civil Rights cases, supra at 13.
The Civil Rights Act cases of 1883 cannot account for the very, very late 1946
development of Supreme Court case law directed to unconstitutional state actions
in furtherance of race discrimination. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947) et al.
But it is submitted that the same process which led the court in 1969 to discover that
all along the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and the thirteenth amendment were directed
to private discrimination might.
28. As late as 1877 Justice Miller, in Davidson v. New Orleans, supra note 17,
wrote in construction of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment:
"[I]t is not possible to hold that a party . . . when, as regards the issues affecting
it, he has, by the laws of the State, a fair trial in a court of justice, according to the
modes of proceeding applicable to such a case." Davidson v. New Orleans, supra
note 17, at 105.
29. E.g., regulation of insurance companies, overruled in Allegeyer v. Louisiana,
165 U.S. 578 (1897). Maximum hours, overruled in Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905). Prohibition of yellow-dog labor contracts, overruled in Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). Compulsory arbitration, overruled in Wolf Packing
Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522 (1923). Pollution control, overruled in
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909). Employment agency regula-
tion, overruled in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917). Mining safety, over-
ruled in Penn Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), etc., etc.
30. Ascribed to Congressman Timothy Campbell of New York, circa. 1885.
MENCKIN, A NEw DICTIONARY OF QUOTATION 214 (1942).
31. Marshall had written of the specific prohibitions addressed to states: "In these
alone were the whole people concerned. The question of their application to states
is not left to construction. It is averred in positive words." Barron v. Baltimore,
supra note 22, at 249.
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(mostly the No-Impairment-to-Contract Clause), business interests
would not be deferred. Pandora's box lay secreted somewhere.
In the Slaughter House cases,32 defeated counsel John Campbell,
a former Supreme Court Justice who had sided with the majority in
the Dred Scott decision, had argued that national citizenship and
state citizenship had, by force of the amendments, become the same. 3
Was this the liberalism of betrayal?
Had he deliberately portrayed the fulsome potentialities of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in protecting rights of Negroes in order to evoke a decision curtailing those
potentialities . . . .34
Blacks would not get the benefits they were promised in 1868. The
court would be too busy.
In 1877, in Munn v. Illinois,"5 the Supreme Court reviewed the
right of Illinois to fix maximum state charges for the storage of grain.
This legislation restricted the freedom of the Chicago grain monopoly
to storage facilities. The regulation was attacked as a violation of
due process of law.
Munn upheld the state. From ancient times, property affected
with a public interest (De Portibus Marls)8 could be subjected to
law maker's regulation.3 1 Settled canons of constitutional construc-
tion left the Supreme Court no Constitutional occasion to question
the reason or the ill wisdom in the exercise of constitutionally allo-
cated power:
We know that this [rate of charge of service for use of public property] is a power
which may be abused; but there is no argument against its existence. For protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts
... . For us the question is one of power not of expediency.38
32. Supra note 24.
33. Hamilton, Path of Due Process Ethics, 48 INT'L L.J. ETHics 269 (1938),
wrote: "The old South had lost in war and at the polls. But someone within its
defeated rank had the vague idea that an appeal to the courts might yet save the
situation. Whose it was is lost to history. But an adage was current. 'Leave it to
God and Mr. Campbell'--and presently Hon. John Archibald Campbell was putting
his ex-judicial mind to a difficult problem."
34. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 149 (1968).
35. Munn v. Illinois, supra note 12.
36. Lord Hale, De Jure Mars, I HARG. L. TRACTS 6 (1675).
37. When in 1934 a new New Deal court decided to adapt new presumptions of
constitutionality to state and Federal measures regulating property, Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934) thoughtfully cited Munn, supra note 12, and Lord
Hale, supra note 36. Of course, by this time (1934) all legislation was required by
due process to be non-capricious, non-arbitrary, and reasonable. Allocating "bur-
dens" is an implicit prerogative of power, not expediency.
38. Munn v. Illinois, supra note 12, at 134.
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Munn v. Illinois was in the great tradition of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, 9 who had written, in Brown v. Maryland: "Questions of power
do not depend upon the degree in which it may be exercised. If it
may be exercised at all, it must be exercised at the will of those in
whose hands it is placed."40
A very different opinion was stated by Justice Field in a dissenting
opinion to Munn v. Illinois:
If this be the sound law, if there be no protection either in the principles upon which
our republican government is founded, or in the prohibitions of the Constitution
against such invasion of private rights, all property and all business in the State
are held at the mercy of a majority of its legislature. 4 1
Justice Field, a former railroad attorney, had dissented in the
Slaughter House cases.4 2  Field's objective was to procure for the
judiciary the power to review state legislative enactments affecting
private property interests on broad sweeping bases of judicial reason.
Evidencing the same attitude, Mr. C. Marshall (no relation to J.
Marshall) wrote an article in the American Law Review48 calling
for a constitutional amendment to overrule the Munn case so "con-
trary to the spirit of our age and the character of our institutions."44
Though conceding the accuracy of Munn's legal tradition, Marshall,
speaking of Field, and what in several years would be a majority of
the Court, wrote:
Is there an institutional spirit, existing as a part of our law, but unexpressed in
constitution or in statute, which a state or federal judge can claim as controlling
authority and which he may invoke against the legislative power?4 5
Marshall was candid enough to seek a constitutional amendment.
In a last line, quoting Henry Summer Maine, he wrote: "When a
democracy governs, it is not safe to leave unsettled any important
questions concerning the exercise of public powers. ' 46  A constitu-
tional amendment was not to be the case. A turning point in Ameri-
can democracy occurred, for then (1890), Chicago, Milwaukee and
39. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 457 (1827). "But arguments
drawn against the existence of a power from its supposed abuse are illogical and
generally lead to unsound conclusions. And this is emphatically so when applied
to our system of government." See note 7, supra.
40. Id. at 439.
41. Munn v. Illinois, supra note 12, at 140.
42. Supra note 24, at 83.
43. Marshall, A New Constitutional Amendment, 24 AM. L. REV. 908, 913 (1890).
44. Id. at 913.
45. Id. at 914.
46. Id. at 913.
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St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota4 7 was decided by a new majority of
railroad lawyers committed to overrule Munn and change the mean-
ing of "due process" from judicial power to determine whether or not
there was due process (were someone else's procedures complied with?)
to, what is due process (i.e., of what must state due process consist?):
The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a
railroad company, involving as it does the element of reasonableness both as regards
the company and as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investiga-
tion, requiring due process of law for its determination.
4 9
In one fell swoop, the Court assumed the power to review legislative
enactments on the basis of due process. Reason then had become
will, a "whether" became an "is." The Court would determine
whether law-makers' acts violated a new due process which forbade
47. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
48. Justice Miller, in Davidson v. New Orleans, supra note 17, at 104, ob-
served that due process had rarely been invoked to limit governmental power until
the war amendments: "But while it has been a part of the Constitution, as a restraint
upon the power of the States, only a very few years, the docket of this court is
crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that State Courts and State
Legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. There is here abundant evidence that there exists some strange
misconception of the scope of this provision as found in the fourteenth amendment.
In fact, it would seem, from the character of many of the cases before us, and the
arguments made in them, that the clause under consideration is looked upon as a
means of bringing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of
every unsuccessful litigant in a State Court of the justice of the decision against him,
and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be founded."
Justice Miller declined to give a "perspicuous, comprehensive and satisfactory"
definition but instead, as per other constitutional provisions, left meaning to the
gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision
shall require, with the reasoning on which such decisions may be founded. (Emphasis
author's) Davidson v. New Orleans, supra note 17, at 104 (what was that reasoning?).
In Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel Morgan, 92 U.S. 480, 481 (1875), the court in a
post-Civil War due process state case wrote: "Our authority does not extend beyond
an examination of the power of the courts to proceed at all." Justice Miller found in
Davidson that there was due process "whenever by the laws of the state" (authorizing
a public taking) there was notice and trial; accord, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877) and Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
The difference in approach to due process before and after 1890 is dramatized by
Davidson, supra note 17, where public takings "cannot be said to deprive the owner
of his property without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be to other
objection." Ten years later precisely those doings (taking property for state public
uses) became the first right incorporated into a new due process of law; of neither
"state" nor of settled meaning, became rather both in meaning and body, the phrase
Supreme Court. In England, due process was the subject of wise, ancient precedent
(when administered by judges); later it became dynamic Parliament. A dynamic,
inclusive due process through judicial definition is peculiar to the American courts'
unique experience administering the phrase.
49. Supra note 47, at 458.
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arbitrary, capricious, oppressive, or unfair legislation.
Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion announced the consequence
of the majority view:
They say in effect . .. that the final tribunal or arbitrament is the judiciary ....
There must be a final tribunal somewhere for deciding every question in the world.
Injustice may take place in all tribunals. All human institutions are imperfect-
courts as well as commissions and legislatures. Whatever tribunal has jurisdiction,
its decisions are final and conclusive unless an appeal is given therefrom. The
important question always is, what is the lawful tribunal for the particular case?
In my judgment, in the present case, the proper tribunal was the legislature .. .50
By 1897, when the case of Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago5'
was decided, the same Court which discovered that corporations were
due process persons, 52 doomed the federal income tax58 and decided
Plessy v. Ferguson54 had become itself due process of law over states55
as only once before the war it had been over Congress. 6
The prohibitions of the amendment refer to all the instrumentalities of the State,
to its legislative, executive and judicial authorities, and, therefore, whoever by
virtue of public position under a state government deprives another of any right
protected by that amendment against deprivation by the State "violates the constitu-
tional inhibition ....- 57
How did the phrase "due process," which referred to a require-
ment of notice or procedures to law enforcement, become a constitu-
tional mandate for life appointees to review in cases whether acts of
law-makers (first state, later federal) violate an orbital due process
of substance, forbidding arbitrary laws? The founding fathers had re-
jected a supreme council of revision to improve or veto law-makers.58
There are three theories.
50. Supra note 47, at 465.
51. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, supra note 22.
52. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
53. Pollack v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1894).
54. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
55. Once the Supreme Court's obligation to enforce equal state due process
became unhinged from state to court, transformation in character, effect and
meaning would also take place in the brother clause-"equal protection of the
laws." This provision, would then endure a latency period forbidding "purely
arbitrary classifications" (1890-1937) and later an active period (1940-present)
forbidding "invidious" discriminations. The reader is cautioned to note that "new"
or so called 1890 "old" varieties of non-racial equal protection have no tap roots to
original equal protection designed for blacks only to guarantee them equal state
law. See infra, note 78, unequally applied because of racial discrimination.
56. Supra note 9.
57. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, supra note 22, at 234.
58. Madison, in the FEDERALIST PAPERS, takes great pains to point out that in
England (and certain colonies) judges were part of the legislative Parliament
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Charles Beard, eminent historian, believed a plot or conspiracy
had occurred. In 1914 and later in 192719 he wrote that two rail-
road congressmen, Roscoe Conklin and John Bingham, had deliber-
ately inserted a phrase "due process" into the new state amendment
so that courts would not be limited merely to protecting the colored
race, but would also be able to protect non-racial property or laissez-
faire capitalism from state regulation under hitherto conceded re-
served powers. In Volume II of his great work on American civili-
zation, Beard wrote:
By a few words skillfully chosen every act of every state and local government which
touched adversely the rights of persons and property was made subject to review
and liable to amendment by the Supreme Court at Washington, appointed by the
President and Senate for life and far removed from local dealings and prejudices
. . . . Thus, the triumphant Republican minority, in possession of the federal gov-
ernment, and the military power, under the sanction of constitutional forms, subdued
the states for all time to the unlimited jurisdiction of the federal Supreme Court
. 60
The late Professor Louis B. Boudin, author of the two volume
Government by Judiciary, rejected Beard's "cabal version" of the
due process grab.6' In an article for the New York University Law
Review in 1936, entitled "Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth
Amendment, '6 2 Boudin attributes the revolution to both Democratic
judges and Republican appointees, each anxious to protect, by judicial
action, invested capital; the united Republicans in the new recon-
structed South; the Democrats; and the national economy elsewhere.
Having failed in the Slaughter House cases, Justice Field, who dis-
sented in Munn v. Illinois, turned to due process, which Boudin writes
"had hitherto gone practically unnoticed and was therefore tabula
rasa, or the empty tablet, into which the Supreme Court could write
(House of Lords). The Constitution's separation of powers schema was completely
different: "The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim, are a further
demonstration of his meaning. 'When the legislative and executive powers are
united, in the same person or body,' . . . 'there can be no liberty, because appre-
hensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to
execute them in a tyrannical manner.' Again, 'were the power of judging joined
with the legislative, the life, and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary
control, for the judge would then be the legislator.'" HAMILTON, MADISON, & JAY,
THE FEDERALIST 247 (Beloff ed. 1948). Only separation of "review" kept these
powers apart.
59. 2 BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 111, 114 (1927).
60. Id. at 114 (emphasis author's).
61. Boudin, supra note 19.
62. Boudin, supra note 19, at 77.
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anything it pleased." Boudin continues:
He, therefore, dissented from the decision of the majority in the Munn Case and in
his dissenting opinion sought to give the "due process" clause a revolutionary
meaning, by making that clause perform the service which the majority of the
Supreme Court had said could not be performed by the "privileges and immunities"
clause.
His first attempt, like the attempt in the Slaughter House, was a failure. But in the
course of the next twenty years, with the passage of time and change of personnel
of the Supreme Court, he succeeded in carrying this revolution to a successful
conclusion with the result that the Supreme Court now is the arbiter of "the whole
range of our national economy."63
Boudin's version is not gainsaid by the judicial vita of the 1890
Court, which discovered that only they (not Congress and the states)
were due process of law:
Justice Field A Nominee of the owner of
(1863-1897) the Central Pacific Railroad.
Justice Fuller Attorney (C.B. & Q. R.R.)
(1888-1910)
Justice Brewer Nephew of Justice Field.
(1889-1910) As a judge he refused to
be bound by Munn v. Illinois.
He held forty-one percent
of the police power laws re-
viewed as Supreme Court Judge
unconstitutional.
Justice Brown Railroad Attorney
(1890-1906)
Justice Shiras Attorney for the B. & 0. R.R.
(1892-1903)
Howell Jackson Railroad Attorney
(1893-1895)
Rufus William Packham Former United States Senator
(1895-1909) from Louisiana. A New York
Judge who denied the authority
of Munn v. Illinois.64
The prestigious Dean Edwin S. Corwin, not content with arguable
muckracking, attributed America's "law of the land" revolution to a
63. Boudin, supra note 19, at 77.
64. A perspicacious remark of Justice Miller, author of the Slaughter House
(supra note 24) and the Davidson decisions (supra note 17), is quoted in BATES,
THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 120 ( ): "It is vain to contend the Judges
who have been, at the bar, the advocates of railroad companies and all the forms of
associated capital, when they are called upon to decide cases where such interests
are in contest all their training, all their feelings are from the start, in favor of those
who need no such influence."
666
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new play of Lord Coke's great Seventeenth Century struggle to har-
ness the King to law.6 5 Recalling in nineteen hundred and nine Lord
Coke's way of "borrowing phrases" for sixteen hundred and eight,
Corwin warned:
The truth is that the moment the court in its interpretation of the 14th Amendment
left behind the definite, historical concept of "due process of law" as having to do
with the enforcement of law and not its making, the moment it abandoned, in its at-
tempt to delimit the police power of the state, its ancient maxim that the possibility
that a power may be abused has nothing to do with its existence, that moment it
committed itself to a course that was bound to lead, however gradually and easily,
beyond the precincts of judicial power, in the sense of the power to ascertain the
law, into that of legislative power which determines policies on the basis of facts and
desires. 6
6
Oh, but it is worse! For Lord Coke, Seventeenth Century due
process of law consisted of judicial restraint, static precedent, or
the respect for binding tradition. Due process in America became
instead an escape from a written constitution, a mandate for change.
Coke used "law of the land" to harness the King. The Supreme
Court used the concept to become one.
It was once settled doctrine that the Supreme Court in reviewing
the constitutionality of state legislation in reserved or police matters,
such as health, safety, or crime could ask only if the questioned act
bore a relationship to power. 7 The Court would rule only if the
state had the power and not whether its exercise there was wise, fool-
65. Corwin, supra note 12.
66. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MicH.
L. REV. 643, 670 (1909): "By 'law of the land' Coke and his associates means ap-
parently merely such way of proceeding on the part of the monarch, when moving
against individuals, as the law, whether ancient custom, the common law, or statute,
ordained and established. But now the source of the guaranty that the monarch
should thus proceed was Magna Carta. It, therefore, behooved the parliamentarians
to exalt Magna Carta as much as possible, or, to quote Sir Benjamin Rudyard, to
make 'that good old decripit Law of Magna Carta, which hath been so long kept in
and bedridden, as it were .. .walk abroad again.'" Corwin, supra note 12, at 369.
See LYON and BLOCK, supra note 5; on the relationship between due process and the
per legem terrain, see Edward Jenks, The Myth of Magna Carta, INDEPENDENT REV.
(1904); 447-2 Kent. Comm. 2d 13; Story Comm. 4 Ed. § 1789; Cooly Const. Lin.
2d Ed. § 351.
67. Marshall's predecessor as court chief, Justice Iredell, had also claimed con-
stitutional court power to void acts of legislatures, though he added in Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 399 (1798): "I admit, that as the authority to declare it
void is of a delicate and awful nature, the court will never resort to that authority, but
in a clear and urgent case. If, on the other hand, the legislature of the Union, or
the legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law within the general
scope of their constitutional power, the court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely
because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice."
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ish or arbitrary."' After new due process, the question became the
rate one. Is the questioned act rational, capricious, arbitrary, in-
vidious, or offensive to various natural justice formulae nowhere to
be found in the document?6 9 After 1890, case controversy and
constitutional dispute would become "but a pretext," (to quote a
phrase )70 from among their honors' lavish calendar of hundreds,7 '
later thousands, of discretion options. 72  As one of the dissenting
Even Marshall's successor, Justice Taney (author of the Dred Scott decision, supra
note 9), seemed clear enough about state power prerogatives. "But what are the
police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less than the powers of govern-
ment inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions . . . . And when
the validity of a State law making regulations of commerce is drawn into question
in a judicial tribunal, the authority to pass it cannot be made to depend upon the
motives that may be supposed to have influenced the legislature, nor can the court
inquire whether it was intended to guard the citizens of the State from pestilence and
disease, or to make regulations of commerce for the interests and convenience of
trade.
Upon this question the object and motive of the State are of no importance, and
cannot influence the decision. It is a question of power. License Cases, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 504, 583 (1847).
68. "The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard. The ablest
and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the court could
properly say, in such an event, would be, that the legislature (possessed of an equal
right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was in-
consistent with the abstract principles of natural justice." Justice Iredell, concurring
in Calder v. Bull, supra note 67, at 396.
69. "[T]here was at one time a line of cases holding 'reasonableness' as the court
saw it to be the test of a due process violation . . . . The Ferguson case [Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 72 U.S. 726 (1963)] totally repudiated the old reasonableness-due
process test, the doctrine that judges have the power to hold laws unconstitutional
upon the belief of judges that they 'shock the conscience' or that they are 'unrea-
sonable,' 'arbitrary,' 'irrational,' 'contrary to fundamental' or some other such flexible
term without precise boundaries. I have many times expressed my opposition to
that concept on the ground that it gives judges power to strike down any law they
do not like." Black, J. dissenting in Tinker v. Des Moines School District, supra
note 20, at 519, holding unconstitutional an Iowa School District regulation banning
the wearing of armbands. The date: 1969.
70. Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 7, spoke of the
"painful duty" of the court to declare that a legislative act was not the law of the
land where Congress under "the pretext" of executing its powers passed laws for the
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to government. The modern trend is to
relax the court's own jurisdictional requirement that they decide any genuine cases
of parties having proper standing. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 831 (1968), provides
an interesting contrast in pretexts. For the art of pretexting by "finding" good
constitutional cases see Voses, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity,
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 314 (1958).
71. Supra note 47.
72. See The Business of the Supreme Court, 51-81 HARv. L. REV. (1937-1968).
This analysis of Supreme Court statistics published in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW pro-
vides interesting data. Since 1937, the Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction
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judges had put it in the Dred Scott decision, or the time the Federal
court became due process over Congress: "Why confine our view
to colored slavery?"713
In the first thirty years, between 1888 and 1918, approximately
seven hundred twenty-five cases were decided under the fourteenth
amendment Due Process Clause."4 That amendment, and primarily
that clause, was the reason to declare two hundred thirty-two state
police power statutes unconstitutional between 1879 and 1938.11
Charles Evans Hughes, later Chief Justice, could say by 1907,
"[W]e are under a Constitution but the Constitution is what the judges
say it is." 7 6
It is to be noted that once due process became severed from "state
laws," then it and its brother, "equal protection of the laws," could77
and would be defined without reference to race at all, a disquieting
analysis which, in color cases anyway, explains why the nineteen
forties' discovery that the Constitution forbade states from racial dis-
crimination seems but a poke71 in between an "old" 1895 equal
had remained a constant 50 percent. Petition figures went from 873 (1937) to 2,323
(1967); cert. granted averaged an eighteen percent basis (1927-1967): In 1937,
1,004 cases were disposed of by denial of cert.: order memorandum decision or
opinion. In 1967 the figure was 2,946; from 1957 to 1967, representing a ten year
average the court disposed in written opinion an average of from one ninety to one
hundred five cases. Whole number due process statistics would be misleading in so
far as much of due process, i.e. the Bill of Rights in state courts, is not classed due
process there.
73. Supra note 9, at 538.
74. BATES, supra note 64, at 205.
75. State cases are collected in CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATIONS (1964).
76. Speech at Elmira, N.Y., May 3, 1907. MENCKIN, supra note 30, at 215.
77. E.g., a clause requiring equality in state voting, (apportionment) (Baker v.
Carr, supra note 23), travel, sentencing, literacy tests, legitimacy, or aid to dependent
children. See Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969). Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
78. As the high court put it in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
669 (1968): "Likewise the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political
theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are constitutionally discrimi-
natory we have never been confined to historic notions of equality any more than
we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time
deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights."
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), marked the end of the first state
action race era (restricting jury duty); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the
beginning of the second; see generally Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960) perhaps Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968) (marks the beginning at the "new" thirteenth amendment).
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protection, forbidding Plessy v. Ferguson's "non-rational" discrimina-
tion," and a latter day saint's "new" equal protection8 0 forbidding in-
vidious" ones, including, by this time, some state action race bias.
79. Supra note 54. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Plessy, wrote: "In my opinion
the judgment rendered this day will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the
decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case." Plessy v. Ferguson, supra
note 54, at 559.
Indeed, the majority opinion was a Dred Scott due process inquiry; not whether
separate was equal (true fourteenth) but whether separate but equal was reasonable
(due process).
The majority opinion read: "So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute
is a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large
discretion on the part of the Legislature." Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 54, at 550.
This is not the inquiry intended by the fourteenth amendment promise of equal state
substantive law, but is instead a version of due process of law.
80. "New" equal protection began its creep in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942), where, on equal protection grounds the court invalidated Oklahoma's
law providing for sterilization of multiple offenders but exempting political offenses.
An even broader statute applicable to misfits had been sustained from due process
challenge in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), Mr. Justice Holmes dismissing the
equal protection contentions there as "the usual last resort of constitutional argu-
ments .... ." Id. at 208. In Skinner, supra, Justice Douglas warned that legislation
involving "basic rights" or "basic liberties" would receive strict scrutiny of any
classification which the state makes "lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious dis-
criminations are made against groups of individuals in violation of the constitutional
guaranty of just and equal laws" Skinner, supra, at 541 (emphasis author's). Old
equal protection forbade states only from discriminatory legislation without "any
reasonable basis or purely arbitrary." One who assailed the classification carried the
burden of proof. After Skinner certain "suspect" criteria affecting "fundamental
rights" (applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause) would be held to deny
equal protection unless the legislation was shown to be justified by a compelling
state interest. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In December, 1970
the Supreme Court upheld in United States v. Arizona, the 1970 Voting Rights Act
giving 18 year olds the vote in states for national elections (Art. I, sect. 4 and Neces-
sary and Proper); a "floating majority" found no power in Congressional Section 5 to
alter state qualification to implement 14th amendment protection. [Even the Colonies
had to establish and maintain their own separate and independent governments,
except insofar as the Constitution itself commands otherwise, Black, J. 39 U.S.L.W.
4029 (Dec. 22, 1970)]: The dissenters found congressional power to enact in state
elections the right to vote by application of a Due Process version of Equal Pro-
tection, i.e., did Congress have a rational basis for its finding? Justice Douglas
added a scholarly appendix listing cases where state statutes were struck under the
Equal Protection Clause on different grounds than race. His headings were:
Statutes Which Discriminated Against Certain Businesses; Indigents; Favored Certain
Business; Taxing Statutes; Treatment of Convicted Criminals; Legitimacy and
Aliens (to which he might have added the controversial political apportionment
cases, Baker v. Carr, supra, note 23, and his own opinion in Skinner): See Karat,
Invidious Discriminations, Justice Douglas and the Return of the Natural Law Due
Process Formula, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716 (1969). The opinions of Brennan, White
and Marshall, 39 USLW 4067 (Dec. 22, 1970) are clear enough. "Although it once
was thought that equal protection required only that a given legislative classification
once made, be evenly applied, see Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887), for
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Neither the "new" nor the "old" equal protection standard was men-
tioned or envisioned by the document. Both, in fact, represent a
Haut Pas of substantive due process,"' railroad vintage.
In 1970, per legem terrain is whatever the Supreme Court forbids
or compels in substance 2 and procedure by cert. discretion in case
more than 70 years, we have consistently held that the classifications embodied in
a state statute must also meet the requirements of equal protection." The Gulf v.
Santa Fe case is also the ancient precedent cited in Douglas' separate opinion ad-
dressed to Non-Racial Equal Protection Case Law. IT IS OF COURSE AN 1896
CASE DECIDED BY THE COURT WHICH CHANGED THE MEANING OF
DUE PROCESS OF LAW. A "rational" Equal Protection analysis to state law is
simply the "reasonableness" test of Substantive Due Process engrafted to Equal Pro-
tection thus affording "new" review jurisdiction to non-racial matters. From a near
term view, the dissents seem more in accord with consistent 14th Amendment Equal
Protection case law but only after a 1890 Due Process Rule of Reason is applied.
Original Equal Protection required not Rationality but consistency.
81. Cox, Forward: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966) put it just about right, "Once loosed, the idea
of equality is not easily cabined." See Bolling v. Shapre, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) where
the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment was used to desegregate by court order
Washington, D. C. schools (because D. C. is not a state the equal protection clause
was inapplicable). "The concepts of equal protection and due process are not
mutually exclusive; the equal protection of the laws is a more explicit safeguard of
prohibited unfairness than due process of law and therefore we do not imply that the
two are always interchangeable phrases." Bolling, supra, at 499; compare equal
protection (1890-1949) with current economic due process (1940-present) or
economic due process, (1890-1935) with today's active equal protection banning
chilling discrimination unredeemed by a compelling state governmental interest, e.g.
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
Mr. Justice Harlan, a federalist, sees the current trend for what it is. In Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259 (1970), he states in a concurring opinion: "The 'equal
protection' analysis of the Court is, I submit, a 'wolf in sheep's clothing,' for that
rationale is no more than a masquerade of a supposedly objective standard for
subjective judicial judgment as to what state legislation offends notions of 'funda-
mental fairness.' Under the rubric of 'equal protection' this Court has in recent times
effectively substituted its own 'enlightened' social philosophy for that of the legis-
lature no less than did in the older days the judicial adherents of the now discredited
doctrine of 'substantive' due process."
82. Due process requires all state and federal legislation to be non-capricious,
non-arbitrary, and non-offensive to undefined "liberty" and fundamentals implicit
in the phrase; it forbids acts, practices, rules and regulations whose vagueness, over-
breadth or tendency to chill the exercise of valued constitutional rights such as
pure, mixed and symbolic speech, press, association, privacy, religion, travel, as-
sembly, or silence violate fundamental fairness. See Civil Disabilities and the First
Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. (1968). Due process commands in state courts the
first eight amendments in a watered down, bi-level or same-breadth construction as
in federal courts. The late Justice Frankfurter, at a 1958 assembly of British uni-
versity heads gathered in the courtroom of the Supreme Court put it all together
this way: "Nevertheless, the ultimate justification for nullifying or saying that what
Congress did, what the President did, what the legislature of Massachusetts or New
York or any other state did was beyond its power, is that provision of the Constitu-
tion which protects liberty against infringement without due process of law. There
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and controversy.83 It happened on the day when "due process of
law" became instead "due process of courts."
are times, I can assure you-more times than once or twice-when I sit in this chair
and wonder whether that isn't too great a power to give to any nine men, no matter
how wise, how well disciplined, how disinterested. It covers the whole gamut of
political, social, and economic activities." FRANKFURTER, OF LAW & LIFE & OTHER
THINGS THAT MATTER 129 (1965).
83. Due process describes undefined fifth amendment procedures required in
criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings of Congress such as immigration, employ-
ment, or civil commitment. Students frequently ask what happened to fourteenth
amendment procedural due process in state cases, once that phrase incorporated
specific federal procedures like the fourth, fifth, or sixth amendment rights. The
answer is: nothing much. Procedural due process requires of states only "funda-
mentals" from time to time, such as, for example, counsel in capital cases, e.g.,
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Balanced juries, fair line-ups (1969), or forums to litigate constitutional rights,
continue irrespective of a specific incorporated Bill of Rights. This procedural due
process related to the court majority's conceptions of fundamental fairness con-
tinues (perhaps in camel-nose fashion) to include and exclude (a la Davidson v.
New Orleans, supra note 17). For all 50 states uniform court rules and pro-
cedures for juveniles [in re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966)], employment, or welfare pro-
ceedings, where fact finding ought to be accompanied by a most fundamental requi-
site of due process, the opportunity to be heard. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (public assistance revocation hearings). Substance and procedure merge
in school cases where a student is expelled for violating unreasonable rules.
Original due process was to be dynamic, bold, capable of progress, change and
refinement too. But as Hurtado v. California, supra note 5, at 534, pointed out,
"Judge Miller in Davidson, says, however, 'It is not possible to hold that a party
has, without due process . . . .been deprived of his property, when, as regards the
issues affecting it, he has by the laws of the State a fair trial .... ' " (emphasis
author's) Accord, Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 266 (1882). "But the action of the
court in cases within its jurisdiction is due process of law." Id., at 288. Hurtado
continues: "Due process of law in the latter [Fifth Amendment] refers to that law
of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon
congress. In the Fourteenth Amendment, by parity of reason, it refers to that law
of the land in each state which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved
powers of the State." (emphasis author's) "The Fourteenth Amendment does not
profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and
the same remedies. Great diversities . . .may exist in two States separated only
by an imaginary line. On one side of the line there may be a right to a trial byjury, and on the other side no such right. Each State prescribes its own modes ofjudicial proceeding." Missouri v. Lewis, supra note 2, at 31.
What a world of difference between the dynamics of fifty possibly different state
procedures; (federalism was a safe experiment) and one fifty-state constitutional
model which will change only if court personnel are willing to forego "strict con-
struction."
Hurtado said that if a proceeding followed usages of England and this country it
was due process: "[B]ut it by no means follows that nothing else can be due process
of law . . . . To hold that such a characteristic is essential to due process of law
would be to deny every quality of the law but its age and to render it incapable of
improvement. It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness
attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians." Supra note 5, at 528-29. Rea-
sonable men could differ on which characteristic would be most like the law of the
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At first per legem terram required states to honor glorious Rosseau
bromides about fundamental liberties or the "spirit of a writing. 8 4
In a while, states were forbidden to abridge, without court sanction,
'implicit liberties,' '85 some specified phrases,8" from federal amend-
Medes, the due process of fifty state procedures changeable by their law and legisla-
tion or a one nation due process, uniform because constitutional, and constitutional
because our countrymen preferred in 1787 and in 1968 to put some fundamental
things in a writing amendable by the people. Query: Why aren't state laws that
provide "inadequate" fact finding procedures in relief cases due process? States
have courts and constitutions.
84. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), spoke not merely of the physical
liberty of the person (corporation), but of liberty to be free in the employment of the
his faculties, livelihood, including liberty of contract necessary, proper or essential
to his carrying out to a successful conclusion these purposes . . . above mentioned,
id. at 589; the 1905 Lochner v. New York decision, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), is the
most famous of the liberty of contract cases forbidding wage and hour regulation.
By 1937 when the High Court discovered that the Constitution does not speak of
liberty of contract (the Court having in the interim voided both state and federal
labor statutes with due process), there were other newer liberties, like free speech,
press, religion and assembly for the now new due process.
The change in the constitutional emphasis through due process justice is best
illustrated by comparing two assembly or speech-plus cases. In Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312 (1921), Justice Taft wrote that the "fundamental principles of right
and justice" or the guarantee that due process in the fourteenth amendment was
"intended to preserve," commanded the issuance of a state injunction sought by a
property owner to enjoin peaceful picketing at his place of business. Nineteen
years later, in 1940, the same conduct, measured by the same phrase in the same
amendment, but at the hands of a different majority, did not command, but forbade
constitutional relief or remedy, A.F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321. The change
is one of value emphasis from personal economy to individual liberty. Due
process makes either easy.
85. Louis BOUDIN, author of the two-volume GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, wrote
bitterly in 1937: "When did this liberty get into the Constitution? . . . [We in-
fused into the old words the new spirit of extreme individualism and now we declare
legislation unconstitutional on the grounds that it is repugnant to this spirit ....
The 'spirit of the Constitution,' the 'spirit of our institutions' and the 'principles of our
government' which are now used as criteria of constitutionality are in themselves
empty phrases into which not only each generation but each individual puts a dif-
ferent context according to his own philosophical, political and social principles."
See Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REV.
431 (1925).
It is interesting to note that by 1924 both Felix Frankfurter (then a Professor)
and Senator LaFollette advocated abolition of the due process clause. See, Shall Due
Process of Law be Abolished, 58 AM. L. REV. 290 (1924).
86. The first judicial amendment to the Constitution took place in 1897. In
that year the Supreme Court defined a new due process to mean or "incorporate"
a fifth amendment phrase: "Nor shall property be taken for a public use without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The process of reading into one amendment the restrictions of other ones is called
"incorporating into due process selected phrases and amendments." Once any
clause becomes incorporated: (1) The Supreme Court obtains new jurisdiction to
review all state cases relating to the rights incorporated. (2) All state courts, or
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ments, later the whole of the forms 7 once enacted to protect states
power.
From state cases in construction of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment came Mutatis Mutandis and a bootstrap "prec-
edent" for the same look at the substance of things in due process
review of law-making by Congress. 88
It was simple. Two things, we are told, equal to the same thing,
are equal to each other. The fifth amendment had, from concep-
tion, been applicable to the Federal Government. The fourteenth
amendment was about states. Both used the same phrase, due process
every town in America, must respect on a uniform basis the Supreme Court's con-
struction from time to time of the content, meaning, emenations and penumbra of
the subject area.
87. The incorporation to states' raison d' etre did not come until twelve years
after the first amendment speech guarantee was casually incorporated as another
fundamental liberty of due process in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Charles Warren, in that year, predicted that the Bar would eventually include into
due process the whole Bill of Rights, adding: "The World Liberty seemed an
especially convenient vehicle into which to pack all kinds of rights." WARREN, supra
note 85 at 439.
In 1937 Justice Cardozo described this strange pursuit in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937): "Whatever would be a violation of the original Bill of Rights
(amendments I to VIII) if done by the federal government is now unlawful by force
of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a state." Id. at 323.
Cardozo refused to accept total incorporation of the Bill of Rights. His task was
to sweeten a track record of 1897 vintage. Only those Bill of Rights provisions
"rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people" would be made binding on
states. In affirming a state conviction for murder over the claim that by two trials
the state of Connecticut had placed the defendant twice in jeopardy for the same
offense he asked: "Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subject
him a hardship so acute and shocking that our policy will not endure it? Does it
violate those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions?" Id. at 328.
Cardozo said of double joepardy, "NO." That was in 1937. Double jeopardy
was incorporated in 1969. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). One could be-
come distracted in wondrous thought why double jeopardy was not at the base of all
our civil and political institutions in 1937 or 1967 but became so in 1969.
88. Osmond K. Fraenkel, a standard-form liberal of the day, wrote in the
NATION (July 10, 1939): "The current conception of due process has caused
more havoc than has any other constitutional doctrine. It has doomed workmen's
compensation, minimum wages, regulation of the hours of labor, regulation of
various kinds of businesses, the establishment of railroad pensions, and a great
variety of taxes. It is time the original meaning of the phrase, a purely procedural
one, be restored."
A leisurely review of the READERS' GUIDE TO LEGAL PERIODICALS from 1934 to
1937 contains provocative thoughts by most respectable authorities for more civil-
ized methods to curtail due process review veto by life appointees of term presidents
than the English Commons threat in the nineteenth century (packing the House of
Lords) or Roosevelt's plans of 1936 to pack the court. See Clark, Some Recent
Proposals for Constitutional Amendment, 12 Wis. L. Rav. 313 (1937).
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of law, didn't they! 89
Contemporaneous with plain due process in state cases came new
radical "tradition" to the phrase. The right to "just compensation"
for a state's taking private property pursuant to their laws and con-
stitutions (as the Supreme Court would henceforth "review"), was
the first clause from the Federal Bill of Rights amendments merged by
the 1897 "railroad court" into due process and made applicable to
states per order of judges.90 Later, "due process," not formal amend-
ment to the Constitution would, for all states, describe from time to
time a first amendment,9 a fourth amendment (as a majority would
89. Due process nearly killed the New Deal. Justices McReynolds, Sutherland,
Butler, and Van Devanter would see to that. These undistinguished jurists formed
the conservative nucleus which, from 1934 to 1936, killed, in the midst of a great
depression, the National Recovery Act, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S.
495 (1935); the Agricultural Adjustment Act, U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1935);
and the Guffey Coal Bill, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). Mc-
Reynolds was appointed in 1914, Van Devanter in 1910, and the other two in 1922.
One commentator wrote recently about that court: "So similar did the court
consider these due process clauses, however, that when it came to abandon 'eco-
nomic due process' it casually overruled a federal case arising under the 14th without
any apparent awareness that two separate constitutional clauses were involved."
90. In the case of Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, supra note 22, the
City of Chicago condemned a railroad right-of-way in order to widen a public
street. Defendant received old due process notice and opportunity to be heard
at the condemnation hearing. The Illinois Constitution required the payment of
compensation for the taking of property for public uses. The jury awarded the
railroad $1.00. Not satisfied with the award in the state court, the railroad appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, and there sought a determination of: "[Tlhe
circumstances under which the final judgment of the highest court of a state in a
proceeding instituted to condemn such property for public use may be reviewed by
this court." Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, supra note 22, at 223. And the an-
swer from the high bench: "In determining what is due process of law regard must
be had to substance not to form . . . . The requirement that the property shall not
be taken for a public use without just compensation is but an affirmation of a great
doctrine established by the common law for the protection of private property. It
is founded in natural equity and is laid down by jurists as a principle of universal
law." Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, supra note 22, at 234.
Only 20 years before, in Davidson v. New Orleans, supra note 17, an orthodox
Supreme Court had under old due process written: "It may violate some provisions
of the State Constitution against unequal taxation; but the Federal Constitution
imposes no restraint on the states in that regard, if private property be taken for
public use without just compensation, it must be remembered that when the Four-
teenth Amendment was adopted the provision in that subject, in immediate juxta-
position in the fifth amendment with the one we are construing, was left out and
thi,. was taken." Davidson v. New Orleans, supra note 17, at 105.
The effrontery of it all. The Davidson decision, overruled by the first Bill of
Rights incorporated to states is the authority most often cited to make applicable by
"judicial inclusion" the rest of them.
91. G~tlow v. New York, supra note 87.
The prestigious Dean Warren in an article entitled The New "Liberty" Under the
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see it) ,92 later selected fifth and sixth amendment clauses.93
The Bill of Rights, restricting only the Federal Government, would
become, by due process "case and controversy" selectively adapted,
adopted or incorporated to state courts sometimes on a single vote
plurality basis, though always including in the delicate mandate of
ultimate incorporation inner and outer discretionary review jurisdic-
tion, emanations, penumbra, rules, incidental emanations, or new due
Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 87, pointed out that the right of freedom of
speech was a less fundamental part of a person's liberty than many other "rights,"
such as, religion, bearing arms (the second amendment), or search and seizure. He
continued: "This historical fact makes it all the more clear, therefore, that if any
right contained in the Bill of Rights is to be regarded as a part of the 'liberty' pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the ground of
its being 'fundamental,' then certainly all the rights which were considered by the
States prior to 1787 as 'fundamental' must be similarly protected." Warren, supra
note 87, at 461. In forty-five years Warren was right sans "more fundamental"
right to bear arms.
92. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). It is noteworthy to contrast the two
great protagonists of whether due process incorporated to states a total gulped
version of the fourth amendment or merely a tepid-sipped "adapted" version. Both
Black and Frankfurter each opposed the other's position for just the same reason.
Black, concurring in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1951), but favoring in
state cases a rule of reason, just as in federal cases, complained of the prevailing
standard (1949-1961) in state cases: "The majority emphasize that these statements
do not refer to their own consciences or to their senses of justice and decency. For
we are told that 'we may not draw on our merely personal and private notions .... '
If the Due Process Clause does vest this Court with such unlimited power to in-
validate law, I am still in doubt as to why we should consider only the notions of
English speaking people to determine what are immutable and fundamental principles
of justice." Id. at 175-76.
Frankfurter, dissenting in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), but
opposed to incorporation, wrote: "The division in this Court over the years re-
garding what is and what is not to be deemed an unreasonable search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the shifting views of members of the Court
in this regard, prove that in evolving the meaning of the Fourth Amendment the
decisions of this Court have frequently turned on dialectical niceties and have not
reflected those fundamental considerations of civilized conduct on which applica-
tions of the Due Process Clause turn.
What the Court now decides is that these variegated judgments, these fluctuating
and uncertain views of what constitutes an 'unreasonable search' under the Fourth
Amendment in conduct by federal officials, are to determine whether what is done
by state police, wholly beyond federal supervision, violates the Due Process clause."
Id. at 239. Were they both right?
93. Fifth Amendment: Just Compensation, Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago,
supra note 22; Self Incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Double
Jeopardy, Benton v. Maryland, supra note 88; Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel,
Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 20; Cross-Examination, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965); Speedy Trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1968); Jury
Trial, Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 3.
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process umbrellas. 94  The fifth amendment privileges against self-in-
crimination95 for example, was applicable to the Federal Government
and in Federal courts only by the Constitution of 1787.96
After the passage of the fourteenth amendment, it was in company
with the other Bill of Rights, held repeatedly not required or appli-
cable in state courts.9 7 After the grab the privilege was held by the
94. E.g., The Constitutional right to counsel includes competent counsel. De-
fendant is entitled to confront and cross-examine his accusers, Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n., 378 U.S. 59 (1964); but need not testify himself, and it is
unconstitutional to comment on his failure to testify, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965). Defendant must not be convicted except by sufficient and untainted
legal evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of all (usually
12) jurors. Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968). Defendant, except in petty
cases, Dyke v. Tyler Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), has a constitutional right
to a trial by jury. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). The jury must be
racially balanced, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), but not blue ribbon.
The right includes right to a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra note 93.
Defendant is entitled at all times to be represented by counsel, Moore v. Michigan,
355 U.S. 155 (1957), accorded one way discovery, Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707
(1967), and counsel on appeal, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). At all
times defendant must be shielded from improper trial publicity, Shepard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 233 (1966), and must be convicted only on untainted evidence, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Real evidence must have been obtained fairly, pursuant
to the more than one hundred and sixty rules of the Supreme Court in the search
and seizure area, supra note 92. Confessions are inadmissible, if the result of an
illegal search for real evidence, Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). Confessions
are admissible when voluntary, if they comply with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). Voluntariness must not be left exclusively to the jury, United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1967). Line up testimony if considered unfair is inad-
missible unless counsel for defendant was notified of lineup, United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 219 (1966).
Every violation of a Constitutional decision is deemed grounds for reversal unless
the state proposes it to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, etc. From
the CODE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES, enacted for State Courts by the United
States Supreme Court in construction of due process of law.
95. ". . . [N]or shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96. Of the four states (New Jersey, New York, Georgia, and South Carolina)
that did not preface their constitutions with a separate bill of rights, none secured
the right against self-incrimination. See LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
405-522 (1968). Barron v. Baltimore, supra note 22; 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
2250 (1940). The Ordinance for the government of the Northwest Territory did
not include the privilege. An Act to provide for the Government of the Territory
Northwest of the River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 stat. 50-53.
97. "[The] first ten articles of Amendment were not intended to limit the
powers of state government .... ." Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 13, 166 (1887).
"[T]he first eight articles of the amendments to the Constitution have reference
to powers exercised by the government of the United States and not to those of the
States ....... Eilenbacker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 34 (1890).
"The first Ten Amendments . . . contain no restrictions on the powers of the
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Supreme Court not applicable to states because not "rooted or funda-
mental.""8  That was 1908. Thirty years later a court of Holmes,
Brandeis and Cardozo wrote that self-incrimination was "not funda-
mental" under "settled" constitutional law.99 Ten years later, Frank-
furter would write, this time in a 5-4 decision, that the matter under
the due process clause was "closed," 100 and then in 1964, whoops,
by one single vote, "fundamental," binding in all respects on all
courts, 101 thereafter, as any five should view, i.e., Miranda et seq.'02
State .... ." Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 174 (1899).
"This court has also repeatedly held that the first eight amendments to the Consti-
tution applied only to the Federal Courts ...... Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83,
88 (1900).
"It is well established that the first eight articles of the amendments . . . have
reference to powers exercised by the government of the United States, and not to
those of the States." Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445, 447 (1904).
"After exhaustive consideration of the subject, this Court has decided that the
Fourteenth . . . does not, through its due process clause or otherwise, have the
effect of requiring the several states to conform . . . to the precise procedure of
the federal courts . . . or Bill of Rights." Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 656
(1948).
"We have held from the beginning and uniformly that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the states any of the provisions of the
first Eight Amendments as such."
"The relevant historical materials have been canvassed by this Court and by legal
scholars. These materials demonstrate conclusively that Congress and the members
of the legislatures of the ratifying States did not contemplate that the Fourteenth
Amendment was a short-hand incorporation of the first eight amendments making
them applicable as explicit restrictions upon the States." Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121, 124 (1958).
98. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 81 (1908). "If the people of New Jersey
are not content with the law as declared in repeated decisions of their courts, the
remedy is in their own hands." Id. at 114.
99. "What is true of jury trials and indictments is true also, as the cases show,
of the immunity from compulsory self-incrimination." Twining v. New Jersey, supra
note 98. "This too might be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as in the
past there are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity as a mis-
chief rather than a benefit, and who would limit its scope, or destroy it altogether."
Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 86, at 325-26.
100. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949). "The notion that the 'due process
of Law' guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight
amendments of the Constitution and thereby incorporates them has been rejected
by this Court again and again, after impressive consideration. See e.g. Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78; Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319. Only the other day the court
reaffirmed this rejection after thorough reexamination of the scope and function of
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46. The issue is closed."
101. Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 93. Every single case cited as "authority" by
Frankfurter, to demonstrate the "closed" issue was overruled by the Warren
Court; Hurtado v. California, supra note 5, was overruled by Duncan v. Louisiana,
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The witness privilege of freedom from self-incrimination, "a symbol
of America," which stirs our hearts, 103 had become five to four, "one
of the principles of a free government."
No amount of chutzpah about relevance "evolution" or modernism
in construction of a modest document allocating powers and setting
out amending procedures can gloss in adverbial bustle roots of five,
but power to overrule millions in construction of just about anything
at all' implicit to an ordered liberty of due process.
supra note 3; Twining v. New Jersey, supra note 98, was overruled by Malloy v.
Hogan, supra note 93; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) overruled by
Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 94 (1966); Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 86, over-
ruled by Benton v. Maryland, supra note 88; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947) overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, supra note 94.
For a hint of more possible opinions on ordered liberty in state cases under
the due process clause see Mr. Justice Harlan's remarks (in dissent) to Baldwin
v. New York, supra note 4, [opinion is in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 79,
138 (1970)]. "It is time, I submit, for this court to face up to the reality implicit in
today's holdings and reconsider 'the incorporation' doctrine ...."
102. GRIZWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 73 (1955); Malloy v. Hogan,
supra note 93, at 9.
103. Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 93. "In thus returning to the Boyd view that
the privilege is one of the 'principles of a free government,' 116 U.S. at 632, Mapp
necessarily repudiated the Twining concept of the privilege as a mere rule of evidence.
." Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 93, at 9.
The Mapp decision was an extension of Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 100, which
incorporated to the states the fourth amendment. At least the 1964 Malloy Court
acknowledged the root of the branch or "where it's all at, so to speak." ". . . [Tihe
view which has thus far prevailed dates from the decision in 1897 in Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 [supra note 22], which held that the Due Process
Clause requires the States to pay just compensation for private property taken for
public use." Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 93, at 4.
104. Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 93, at 9. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston,
424 F.2d 1281 (Ist Cir. 1970) "As we discuss below, we believe that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a sphere of personal
liberty for every individual, subject to reasonable intrusions by the state in further-
ance of legitimate state interests . . . . We do not say that the governance of
the length and style of one's hair is necessarily so fundamental as those sub-
stantive rights already found implicit in the 'liberty' assurance of the Due Process
Clause, requiring a 'compelling' showing by the state before it may be impaired.
Yet 'liberty' seems to us an incomplete protection if it encompasses only the
right to do momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with those per-
sonal aspects of our lives which have no direct bearing on the ability to enjoy their
liberty. As the court stated in Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891), 'No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law' ....... Id. at 1285.
For more on the thickets to due process, hair, moustaches, black berets [Hernan-
dez v. School Dist. No. 1, 315 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970)], or freedom buttons
[Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966)] rights implicit to about half the
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The Constitution was not about implicit liberty, ordered by the
Third Branch of government. It was about the powers of others to
legislate and to govern. 10 An implicit constitution is an Honorable
Lie.
In Lord Coke's day, supremacy of one King over most men had
been overcome by his vision of a fundamental law higher than all
men. In poetic irony, a democracy of most men was overruled by
fundamental law determined by five to nine men cum tenure sans
election. In 1890 there occurred misconstruction by the worst Court
in American History. The Constitution then became "flexible," for
when interpreter became lawmaker, procedure became substance; all
had become the Judges. Indeed in Per Legem Terrain, a Review
Mandate stolen by the Barons, but relished by every court thereafter
lies Revolutionary Truth. In ten years, the demise of Union appor-
tioned by Constitution, the Death of E Pluribus Unum.
Federal District Court's judges which have ruled on them in the last few years see
Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: A Non-Constitutional Analysis 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373 (1969).
The recent areas of "constitutional" dimension seem more centered on the men
than the law. In recent cases two judges ruled pro and con long hair; both were
members of the same district court, each used due process, but only one saw David's
right to shoulder length life style as implicit to the concept of ordered liberty. See
Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Perhaps it is time to amend the
Constitution to define the phrase.
The most interesting of the due process amendments proposed yesterday was
made by the late Dean Clark of the Yale Law School. SR-3 in the 74th Congress
1st Session 1936 reads: "Due process of law provisions of the 5th and 14th amend-
ments to this Constitution shall have reference only to the requirements that every
person in any manner aggrieved by an act of another shall be entitled to a fair and
impartial trial or hearing and adjudication if his grievance according to the recog-
nized processes of law."
105. In the author's opinion the better solution to the problems posed by a sub-
jective, personal, due process lacking genuine historicity and bench marks is to rescue
the judges from their onerous mandate where Congress or the states have duly en-
acted legislative laws of due process.
An amendment then would simply provide that the phrase shall refer to pro-
cedures according to the laws of Congress or the states. This would not affect Bill
of Rights specifics, (amend. 1-8) or required in Federal courts, nor would it
necessarily forbid interum court Due Process Common Law. The amendment would
however, make it clear and explicit that in Constitutional supremacy terms laws
enacted by Constitutional law makers shall be due process of law.
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APPENDIX A*
COMPARISON OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES WITH LEGISLATORS
Only protection from institutional oppression can justify appointed
judges as due process supreme law makers in a voting democracy or re-
public. On a checks or balance basis the Supreme Court judges, as per
chart may demonstrate, fare rather badly in comparison with elected legis-
lators of Congress or the states.
SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE
Term president with Senate
approval
Term President's nomina-
tion and Senate vote
Senate hearings prior to
approval
A couple of thousand
cert. options a term
Partisan cases, written
briefs and oral arguments;
Amicus Curiae; law clerks,
law reviews, cases, and
the man himself
Cases appealing to dis-
obedience of prior law
If judge's experience was
legislative, he is suspect as
"political." If it was ju-
dicial, it is not
particularly relevant to
legislating due process at
a Supreme Court level.
STATE OR FEDERAL
LEGISLATOR
Public
Public subscription
Public avowals before
election, legislative voting
record afterwards
Same
Legislative process: self
interest, public pressure,
vote pressure, lobbies,
committees, etc.
Platform election, majority
vote and usual non exercise
of an executive veto
Open
Senate impeachment
None
2 to 6 yrs. at a time
Voters' choice
Party Nominee or
professed independent
Term stated
Customarily hundreds
Appointing
Agency
Vesting
Process
Platform
Inventory
Legislative
Visibility
Level
Change of
Law
Prior
Experience
Term
Recall
Settled
Criteria for
Appointment
Predictable
Term of
Service
Number Nine (5)
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APPENDIX B*
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
XXVI
DUE PROCESS OF LAW SHALL, WHEN USED IN THE CON-
STITUTION, REFER ONLY TO NOTICE, PROCEDURES, HEAR-
INGS OR TRIALS ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF CONGRESS
OR THE STATES RESPECTIVELY, EXCEPT AND PROVIDED
THAT THIS AMENDMENT SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED TO
DENY OR ABRIDGE IN FEDERAL COURTS RIGHTS OR PRO-
CEDURES REQUIRED BY AMENDMENTS I TO VIII (THE BILL
OF RIGHTS).
The great question which, in all ages, has disturbed mankind and brought on
them the greatest' part of those mischiefs which have ruined cities, de-
populated countries and disordered the peace of the world, has been not
whether there is power in the world, not whence it came, but who should
have it.
John Locke
Treatise of Government
1690
* Author's Note
Separation of powers was once the essence of the American Constitution. In
vertical apportionment, all powers not stated (federal) were reserved (state). At
the horizontal level, powers of lawmaker, executive and judiciary, were com-
partmentalized through definitions into numbered articles. The whole schema of
separateness, borrowed from the Continent and Montesquieu (1689-1775) seemed
utterly inconsistent with an American House of Lords. In fact the Founding
Fathers had considered and rejected a Supreme Council to revise laws of Congress
or the states. This was the Uuion which survived the Civil War fought to preserve
it. Even so, perhaps from Lord Acton in action (a good reason for or against
separating governmental powers), few could doubt that as early as Roosevelt's
Packing Plan, or as late as the tawdry, Fortas, Haynesworth and Carswell's affairs,
the real managerial class in the U.S. that counted, had become the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court. The resulting human effects from a constitution
nearly void for vagueness may be over-stated by Robert Hutchins, Director of the
Center for the study of Democratic Institutions. He writes in 1968:
The limits of dissent cannot be limits set by law, because nobody knows
what the law is, and while the Supreme Court sits, nobody will. What
was illegal yesterday is lawful today, because the Court changes its com-
position or its mind. The only way to find out whether an ordinance,
regulation or statute is Constitutional is to violate it and see what happens.
(Center Magazine-1968)
The Author contends the main problem lies in lost courts victimized by discretions
and inclusions addressed to definitional ambiguity in the "who is it" and the "what
of it" to the phrase Due Process of Law.
An ecological amendment, addressed to power and definition is proposed to effect
a lot less sail and a little more anchor to our American Constitution. Hopefully,
issues will not be left conveniently obscured by pettifogging over "strict and liberal
construction" or the relevance to the property v. liberty versions of fundamentals in
due process of law. The exercise of stolen powers by appointees in defense of re-
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quiring states to pay fifth amendment "just" compensation for taking intra-state
property for public uses (the First Bill of Rights incorporated into Due Process-
1897), or to rescue freedom of speech in state courts (the Second Mandate-1925),
will remain forgotten vice or proclaimed virtue only in tired analysis suspiciously
separate and inexpediently aged, as if it were that properti privati was not the
like of the other liberties. Maybe the new property ought to be the old due process
of states and the powers of eminent domain. At least if due process cannot be
"cabined" (see Cox, supra Note 81), it is time we let the smoke out. Due process
and Amicus Curiae have too long kept us from humble truths about the Union and
the Constitution.
The proferred amendment restores to states and to Congress, (except as modified
by the Bill of Rights) some awesome pre-1890 prerogatives left primiry government
over liberty or property by the Constitution of 1787 as it was purged of racism in
its color amendments of 1868. We might just be astonished at the flexibility and
potential for safe, novel law change and experiment under that system. Maybe we
owe a second try at it to the ghost of the First Substantive Due Process Court De-
cision, Scott v. Sandford (1857).
